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The definition of human trafficking as set in the Trafficking Protocol (also known as the 
Palermo Protocol) functionally centres most of the response to the phenomenon in the 
criminal justice system. This occludes many of the sociopolitical determinants of vulnerability 
that leads to trafficking.  It also discourages any real debate about the various forms of 
oppression and even structural violence that act as catalysts to the human trafficking market.  
The Trafficking Protocol, and a vast number of international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations and governments, focuses on statistics of prosecution rates, arrests, victim 
typology and organised crime. I use the example of bride trafficking along the Sino-Burmese 
border to illustrate the complications and, in certain instances, harm that befall an anti-
trafficking regime that does not use a wider lens of migration, agency, development and 
gender equality to address the factors leading to exploitation. 
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Within the past two decades, the densely populated region of Yunnan province, China and 
mainland Southeast Asia (commonly referred to as the Mekong River Region) has been 
characterised as a major ‘hot spot’ for human trafficking. 2  In 2000, the United Nations 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (Trafficking Protocol) created an international standard for governments to pass 
national legislation on human trafficking and set the parametres of how acts now considered 
the crime of human trafficking constitute a global crime. In 2008, the People’s Republic of 
China responded to the growing international concerns of human trafficking within and across 
                                            
1  I would like to thank the Center for East Asian Studies and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at 
Stanford University, United States of America. Workshops and some of the interviews were conducted under the auspices of 
the Stanford China Center at Peking University, China, and gracious support was given by Dr Kimberly Singer Babiarz and Dr 
Helen Stacy. 
2  G Bonanno, ‘Development Dynamics in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region: Trans-Boundary Routes of Human Insecurity’, 
GMSARN International Journal, vol. 6, 2012, pp. 97—104; K Chalk, ‘Taking the Journey Together: A United Response to 
Trafficking in the Mekong Region’, World Vision International, 2006; W van Schendel, L Lyons & Michele Ford, Labour 
Migration and Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia: Critical perspectives, Routledge, London, 2012. 
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its borders by establishing a National Action Plan. Burma, Thailand and Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Laos) also developed national legislation along with bilateral 
Memorandums of Understanding aimed at combating different forms of cross-border human 
trafficking. Responding to the Trafficking Protocol (also known as the Palermo Protocol) with 
national legislation or action plans has become the norm in countries around the world.  
 
Since the Chinese government launched its 2008 National Plan of Action on Combating 
Trafficking in Women and Children, the Chinese marriage market has been scrutinised for its 
connections to human trafficking activities. Instances of transnational marriage, mail-order 
brides and commercial networks of marriage migration are becoming more prevalent 
throughout this region and the world.3 China’s sex-ratio imbalance at birth and resulting 
gender imbalance has created a demand for brides that outstrips China’s domestic 
populations. Additionally, across the border in Burma, extreme poverty, land grabs and 
military conflicts have made livelihoods unsustainable for many women in Burma. These 
factors have expanded the market for marriage transactions across the border even though 
Burma has ratified the Trafficking Protocol and institutionalised an Anti-Trafficking Police 
Task Force. 
 
Though the Trafficking Protocol does not explicitly mention forced marriage or bride 
trafficking in its definition of human trafficking, the term ‘slavery-like practices’ incorporates 
the many forms of domestic or gendered exploitation that the drafters intended to constitute 
as human trafficking.4 Scholars and activists are eager to identify, classify and target forced 
marriage as bride trafficking in Asia. Governments such as those in China and Burma are being 
pressured to increase the prosecution rates of bride trafficking offenses and maintain positive 
reputations abroad, especially under the influence of the United States Department of State 
Trafficking in Persons Report. This creates a focus on policing borders, raids, arrests and 
criminal enterprises linked to forced marriages. This emphasis on criminality, catalysed by 
the Trafficking Protocol, is complicated by marriage practices within China and the complex 
and historical connections between cross-border ethnic groups. The ‘means, force, and 
exploitation’ factors found in the Trafficking Protocol do not always align with the situations 
of brides and migratory marriage, and marriage transactions today exist on a continuum that 
cannot be easily divided between human trafficking and consensual marriage. 
 
Rather than define a clear distinction between consensual marriage and bride trafficking, I 
instead observe the structural factors within Chinese society that have altered its age-old 
marriage market and border relations. The border of Yunnan province and Burma has a history 
of being a transit point for trade (both licit and illicit), and thus, the main site for addressing 
the issue. Along the Yunnan-Burma border, Chinese men usurp Yunnan’s historical trade and 
kinship networks in search of wives. Many of these men are utilising the ties ethnic minority 
groups have across borders, and creating demand in the market for arranging marriage 
transactions. Deciding to procure a wife, by any means possible, is the result of marriage 
market shifts in China and the blurring of the lines between cross-border marriages and 
traditional matchmaking industries. 
 
How can the Protocol’s influence on national legislation and grassroots effort be adapted to 
account for China’s historical marriage practices, the new causes for increased demands for 
                                            
3  W Yang & M Lu, Asian Cross-Border Marriage Migration: Demographic Patterns and Social Issues, Amsterdam University Press, 
Amsterdam, 2010. 
4  This was at the behest of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, found in the supra 
notes of the Protocol. D MacLean, ‘Commercial Marriage Trafficking: Uncovering a Growing New Form of Transnational 
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brides, and the evolving marriage market in China and along China’s border with Burma? It is 
clearly the case that some women from Burma are deceived and forced to marry Chinese men 
against their will. However, my research shows that many of these same women, when given 
options, chose to remain in their Chinese marriages. This is just one example. Other women 
choose to be sold to Chinese men, and others return home to Burma after the birth of their 
first child. Criminal prosecutions do not address the vulnerabilities of the poor or the 
difficulties facing migrants who travel from Burma in China. Marriage values and practices 
that cross national borders are responses to larger social, demographic and economic changes 
occurring in both countries. Broader issues of immigration policy, economic development and 
women’s agency, I argue, need to be incorporated into the current anti-human trafficking 
regime. 
 
The process of criminalising marriage transactions as bride trafficking is a starting point to 
launch a deeper study into the complexities and root causes of the cross-border exchange of 
people between China and Burma. This process reflects many of the values of the 
international institutions and treatises, but these global, one-size-fits-all responses do not 
always serve the people they are meant to help.  
 
Outside the Scope of the Trafficking Protocol 
According to United Nations (UN) statistics, the natural sex ratio at birth is 104 males to every 
100 females.5 Over the past three decades, Azerbaijan, Armenia, China, India and South 
Korea have experienced exponential disparities in this birth ratio. In 1982, the Chinese 
national average was 108.5 males per 100 females. This has increased to an average of 118 
males per 100 females in 2012.6 A wide range of reports, including those from official Chinese 
government bureaus, estimate that around 22 to 30 million Chinese men will be unable to 
find wives by 2025–2030.7 In China today, marriage is a nearly universal practice. According to 
China sociologists James Lee and Wang Feng: ‘the proportion of Chinese women who have not 
married by age 30 has remained consistent at 1% for the last three hundred years.’8 Over 10% 
of the population will not be able to secure traditional marriages or long-term partnership in 
their lifetime. These men are called guangun,‘bare branches’ in Chinese, because of their 
inability to produce a child and continue the family lineage. Chinese demographers Wei Xing 
Zhu and Li Lu estimate that ‘China will see very high and steadily worsening sex ratios in the 
reproductive age group for the next two decades’.9 
 
More and more Chinese women are migrating to larger urban centres for economic 
opportunities and better marriage prospects. Migrant networks in cities and online domestic 
websites are creating spaces for migrant women to meet urban men. For example, many 
cities now have legal services for domestic matchmaking of migrants that are organised by 
the Committee of Matchmaking Service Industries in Beijing.10 A marriage to a man with an 
                                            
5  Ibid. 
6  S Greenhalgh, ‘Patriarchal Demographics? China’s Sex Ratio Reconsidered’, Population and Development Review 38, 2012, p. 
133. 
7  N He, ’Brides and Prejudice in China’, China Daily, 23 August 2010, retrieved 5 February 2015, 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/23/content_11186841.htm; T Hesketh & J Min Min, ‘The Effects of Artificial 
Gender Imbalance’, European Molecular Biology Organization Report, vol. 13, issue 6, 2012, p. 488. 
8  Comparatively, 15% of Western women have not married by this age. J Z Lee & W Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: 
Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities, 1700—2000, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 67. 
9  Z W Xing, L Lu & T Hesketh, ‘China’s Excess Males, Sex Selective Abortion, and One Child Policy: Analysis of Data from 2005 
National Intercensus Survey’, BMJ, 2009, p. 6.  
10  L Wu, ‘China Releases Chinese Marriage Situation Survey Report 2011’, All China Women’s Federation, 2012, retrieved 5 
February 2015, http://www.womenofchina.cn/html/womenofchina/report/136873-1.htm 
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urban hukou11 means that a woman is able to re-register her new status and receive the 
better medical, housing and education services for her children.12 This trend intensifies the 
problems caused by the sex ratio imbalance. In most provinces, even if women were to stay in 
rural areas, there would still be an imbalance between the genders. The resulting ‘marriage 
squeeze’ has produced challenges and pressures on the marriage market, and this is 
especially salient in rural and impoverished areas. 
 
Many of these impoverished rural communities are in provinces that do not offer the robust 
social services and protection programmes that many wealthier provinces on China’s east 
coast are able to offer. 13  Without a safety net, these men often are forced to remain 
dependents in their family homes. Entire villages in China are being labelled ‘bare branch 
villages’ when up to 20% of the population consists of unmarried men.14 
 
The bride price has again fluctuated to reflect this dearth of women. Current estimates put 
the bride price for Han Chinese women between ‘12,300–41,000 RMB (c. USD 1,500–5,000)’.15 
Though this number can vary based on location or income level, it has, on average, increased 
dramatically since the pre–1978 era. In addition to this bride price, Chinese men are often not 
even considered by women for marriage if they do not have a whole suite of material assets.16 
This is a major economic burden for many men, and it is almost inconceivable for China’s 
most poor. 
 
The marriage strategy that is gaining far greater traction across China is the deployment of 
international markets for finding brides. International marriage commodification in East and 
Southeast Asia is not new, but it is a growing trend in many countries. More developed 
countries such as Japan and South Korea have created sophisticated marriage business models 
that bring women from Cambodia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, to marry domestic 
men. Since 1990, over 20,000 women from overseas have arrived in Japan to become 
spouses.17 Some international marriages still rely on personal connections between kinship 
groups or migrant groups. Other international marriages rely on agencies (both illegal and 
legal), tools such as the internet and media18, and well-connected networks of brokers. In 
these marriages, both parties can be aware of the specifics of the arrangements, or the man’s 
financial situation, living conditions or physical attributes are hidden until the arrival of the 
woman.19 Families with sons who have physical disabilities are often reliant on these markets. 
                                            
11  Hukou is the Chinese name for the record used in China’s household registration system. This record documents where a 
person is born and lives, who their family is, and where they are able to access state resources. 
12  C Fan & Y Huang, ‘Waves of Rural Brides: Female Marriage Migration in China’, 1998; Y Sun, Corruption and Market in 
Contemporary China, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2004; T Lin, S Short & L Hui, ‘Shuangchongwailaizhe de 
sheng huo, nvxinghun yin yi min de sheng huojing li fen xi’ (‘The life of double outsiders, an analysis of the experience of 
women marriage migrants’), She huixue Yan jiu (Sociology Research), vol. 104, no. 2, 2003, pp. 75—83. 
13  R Kaur, ‘Mapping the Adverse Consequences of Sex Selection and Gender Imbalance in India and China’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, XLVIII, 2013, p. 39; E Sharygin, A Ebenstein, & M das Gupta, ‘Implications of China’s Future Bride Shortage 
for the Geographical Distribution and Social Protection Needs of Never-Married Men’, Population Studies, vol. 67, issue 1, 
2012, pp. 39—59. 
14  Q Jiang & J J Sanchez-Barricarte, ‘Socio-Demographic Risks and Challenges of Bare-Branch Villages in China’, Asian Social 
Work and Policy Review, vol. 7, issue 2, 2013, p. 104. 
15  H Peters, ‘Heaven is High and the Emperor is Far Away: Beijing Certainties Encounter Yunnan Ambiguities’, Conference 
paper: The Human Rights Challenge of Globalization in Asia-Pacific-US, The Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children in Honolulu, Hawaii, 2002. 
16  Personal interview with Zhang Youlan in Kunming, China, 15 November 2013. 
17   H Wang & S Chang, ‘The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-border Marriage Business in Taiwan and Viet Nam’ 
International Migration, vol. 40, issue 6, 2002, p. 94. 
18  D Belanger, K Thu Hong & T Giang Linh, ‘Transnational Marriages between Vietnamese Women and Asian Men in Vietnamese 
Online Media’, Journal of Vietnamese Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2013, pp. 81—114. 
19  G Jones, ‘International Marriage in Asia: What do we know, and what do we need to know?’, Asia Research Institute (ARI) 
Working Paper No. 174, ARI, 2012, p. 14. 
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In almost all reported cases of international marriage transactions, the woman is the one to 
migrate to a country or region with higher levels of economic development. These potential 
economic benefits make international marriage the choice for many women, despite the risks. 
 
Marriage Markets at the Yunnan-Burma Border 
For Chinese men, harnessing the historical trade relations between Yunnan and Burma and 
the vulnerability of Burmese20 populations across the border is a practical means to expand 
the marriage market. A decade ago, most of the international marriages spanning the Yunnan-
Burma border were local and taking place within particular ethnic groups. These marriages 
had similar traditions of bride prices and ‘go-betweens’ to arrange the meeting of new 
couples, but rarely did the transaction take place over long distances. Now, men and their 
families from all of China’s provinces have the option to travel to Yunnan or to arrange cross-
border transactions to find a wife.21  Chinese gender researcher Zhang Jiayu recounted a 
conversation with a party official stating: ‘Under the open and reform policy, if men cannot 
get brides in China, they can find them in other countries’.22 These practices, as Zhang 
illustrates, are making their way to Chinese policymakers. Yunnan’s economic development 
and trade relations have given Chinese men the option to seek brides from Burma. Men gain 
access to markets in towns such as Ruili and Jinghong, and negotiate with those who have 
connections across the border.  
 
Bride price, in this context, is a fee that the man must pay to arrange the procurement of a 
woman, her transportation and, depending on the situation, her documentation. This 
documentation is the only addition to what is considered included in the traditional bride 
price. Currently in Yunnan, international marriages are legal once the bride produces 
documentation from her home country to prove her ‘single’ status. A new husband is able to 
register his new wife at the local Bureau of Civil Affairs and pay a fee for any child produced 
in the marriage.23 According to China’s UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP) 
office, many Burmese women do not have documentation or even national identification 
cards.24 Some marriages are not documented and those women remain illegal immigrants 
within Yunnan or other provinces, but others rely on forged documentation or connections 
that their brokers can provide. 
 
Chinese men, through the use of brokers, pay less than one-fourth of the bride price of 
Chinese women (both Han and ethnic minority women) for a woman from Burma.25 In one 
common case, a Chinese man bought a bride and her documentation from northern Shan state 
for only CNY 1,200 (USD 185).26 Burmese women are among the cheapest international brides 
in China because of their economic status and relatively lower physical desirability. The 
average annual income in 2011 for Burmese families, according to the UN Children’s Fund 
                                            
20  Note here that ‘Burmese’ does not mean ethnically ‘Burman’ but includes any person or ethnic group living inside Burma. 
21  Personal interview with researcher at the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, China, 21 March 2013. 
22  J Zhang, ‘Imbalanced Sex Ratio at Birth and Women’s Human Rights in China: A Rights Analysis and Comparative 
Implications’, Master of Arts Thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010, p. 38. 
23  Personal interview with staff member UNIAP-China, in Beijing, China, 14 October 2013. 
24  Interviews for this study were conducted with key informants such as local and domestic NGOs working on human trafficking 
in both China and Burma. The author also conducted fieldwork in the city of Ruili, China, and surrounding villages in Yunnan 
province by using informal interview and participant and non-participant observation. Future fieldwork and qualitative data 
gathering is currently being planned by the author.  
25  H Peters. 
26  Palaung Women’s Association, ‘Stolen Lives: Human Trafficking from Palaung areas of Burma to China’, Palaung Women’s 
Association, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 2011, p.22. 
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(UNICEF), was less than USD 735.27 Comparatively, China’s average income per capita in 2011 
was USD 4,930 and, in the United States of America, this number was at USD 48,450.28 Though 
regional differences within Burma can create variation in these specific numbers, 
approximately 75% of the population lives below the poverty line.29 Once considered world-
class through the mid–1900’s, Burma’s schools, hospitals and other vital infrastructure are 
considered unfit by most international standards today. In 2013, government expenditures on 
health and education combined consisted of 2.3% of the national budget, but the spending on 
military and defence was 20.86% of the national budget.30 
 
Villages with large populations of Burmese brides in China are sometimes referred to as ‘black 
villages’ because of Burmese women’s darker skin. 31  The international marriage market, 
across China and most of East Asia, currently operates through a hierarchy based on the 
perceived advantageous attributes of women’s home country. For women from Burma, this 
generally places them at the bottom of the market after Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. 
The bride price, along with the trade networks along the border, make this region one of the 
most sought-after for international brides for ‘bare branches’, who otherwise have no 
prospects for marriage.  
 
Applying the Protocol to Burmese Women 
Anti-trafficking responses from the Chinese and Burmese governments mirror the ideals 
propagated by the Trafficking Protocol. Burmese brides in Yunnan are labelled as ‘trafficking 
victims’ and become the targets of the Chinese police force’s rescue and repatriation 
campaigns. In reality, despite how they entered China, Burmese women who have passed 
through the Chinese marriage market often vacillate between ‘victim’ and ‘agent’ in their 
new Chinese context. International and domestic efforts to end human trafficking in the 
region do not take into account the vast range of circumstances facing Burmese women in 
China. Instead, she is identified by both countries as a victim of human trafficking. If this 
victim is fortunate, according to the anti-trafficking regime, she is rescued and saved by the 
Chinese police and then safely returned to her home in Burma. Accounts from police raids and 
rescues are harrowing and describe torturous conditions suffered by women at the hands of 
their husbands, his family and the people responsible for bringing them across the border. 
After consulting local anthropologists in the region, non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
workers, local government and police, reports from Burmese organisations based in the 
region, and interviews from Burmese women who had returned from China, I found that these 
exploitative situations do occur, but that this type of victimology overshadows many of the 
other experiences of Burmese women. More importantly, both the Chinese and Burmese 
governments rely on criminal interdiction to satisfy commitments to the international 
                                            
27  UNICEF, ‘Statistics: Republic of Myanmar’, UNICEF, 2011, retrieved 27 February 2015, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/myanmar_statistics.html 
28  UNICEF, ‘Statistics: China’ UNICEF, 2011, retrieved 27 February 2015, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/china_statistics.html; UNICEF, ‘Statistics: United States’ UNICEF, 2011, retrieved 27 
February 2015, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/usa_statistics.html 
29  Burmese Women’s Union, ‘Caught Between Two Hells: The Report Highlights the Situation of Women Migrant Workers in 
Thailand and China’,  Burmese Women’s Union, 2007, p.7. 
30  Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand, ‘Driven Away: Trafficking of Kachin Women on the China-Burma Border’, Kachin 
Women’s Association of Thailand, 2005, p. 15;  K H Mon, ‘UNICEF Tells Govt to Increase Education, Health Spending’ 
Irrawaddy News, 7 November 2013, retrieved 27 February 2015,  http://www.irrawaddy.org/un/unicef-tells-govt-increase-
education-health-spending.html; N Aye, ‘Military Spending Challenged in Parliament’, Democratic Voice of Burma News, 19 
February 2013, retrieved 27 February 2015, http://www.dvb.no/news/military-spending-challenged-in-parliament/26476 
31  ‘Henan nongcunnannubilieshitiao, miandianfunujiarudangdi’ (‘Demographic imbalance between male and female in rural 
areas of Henan Province, Burmese Women married illegally into the local villages’), WangyiXinwen, 16 June 2006, retrieved 
27 February 2015, http://news.163.com/06/0616/10/2JO04A760001124J.htm 
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community under the Trafficking Protocol mandate, instead of reforming institutions and 
systems that make these women vulnerable in both Burma and China.  
 
Under the China National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–
2012), the Chinese government identified child abduction, forced marriage and trafficking 
into the sex industry as the crimes that would be pursued by the criminal justice system at 
the national and provincial levels. During the early 2000s, the Chinese government added 
eight articles to the Chinese Criminal Penal Code, all of which address issues termed 
‘trafficking in persons’.32 The powerful Ministry of Public Security coordinated these reforms 
and established a consortium of thirty-four other ministries and bureaus to work on human 
trafficking. On 8 February 2010, China signed and ratified the Trafficking Protocol. By 2013, 
the government put forward China’s Action Plan Against Human Trafficking (2013–2020) that 
added labour trafficking, forced begging, child performance, and organised theft to the list of 
human trafficking crimes.33 Despite these inclusions, the Chinese government continues to 
mainly focus on child abductions and bride trafficking, due to international concerns. In 2010, 
the Chinese government also made it illegal for matchmaking services and agencies to include 
foreign clients.34 Domestic Chinese marriage agencies continue to flourish but cross-border 
agencies have been legally conflated with bride trafficking.  
 
In implementing the Action Plans, the Ministry of Public Security uses ‘strike-hard’ (hard-
hitting) campaign 35  policies to target traffickers. These campaigns, similar to anti-drug 
campaigns, are short-lived and expensive, both in terms of financial expenditures and human 
capital. The Chinese government is able to defer reforms to economic or immigration policy 
by pursuing these campaigns despite their dismals success rates. According to Chinese 
sociologist Gracie Ming Zhao: ‘One consequence of such a style is during a specific strike-hard 
campaign period, the criminals of a targeted activity are likely to face a more severe 
punishment than in a normal period…but most offenders learn to take advantage of it.’36 The 
offenders coordinate their own actions based on the timings between raids. However, the 
hard-hitting campaigns against bride trafficking are highly publicised in the national media. 
High-profile celebrities have made documentaries that follow local police forces conducting 
raids on trafficking rings and returning brides to their home countries.37 Pictures of Burmese 
women in the company of Chinese police officials flood websites, news outlets and China’s 
microblogs (such as the popular Twitter-like website, Weibo) without concern for the privacy 
of the victims. On the other hand, other types of exploitation in labour industries are 
censored by the government and not included in these raids. Despite quarrels over human 
rights issues between China and Western powers, China continues to strive to fit the 
international mould when it comes to anti-trafficking efforts. China wants its system of 
criminal interdiction against human trafficking to be considered up to international and 
Trafficking Protocol-driven standards.  
 
                                            
32   These include 234 A, 240, 241, 242, 244, 262, 276 A, and 358. Text and description available at: retrieved 5 February 2015, 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/clotproc361/ 
33  中国反对拐卖人口行动计划, General Office of the States Council, no. 9, 2 March 2013, retrieved 27 February 2015, 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-03/08/content_2349019.htm 
34  K L Huang, ‘Illegal Chinese Cross-Border Matchmakers Flourish as Demand Grows’, South China Morning Post, 12 November 
2013, retrieved 5 February 2015, http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china-insider/article/1354390/illegal-chinese-cross-
border-matchmakers-flourish-demand-grows 
35  The term ‘strike-hard campaign’ is the Chinese expression. 
36  G Z Ming, ‘Trafficking of women for marriage in China: Policy and practice’, Criminology and Criminal Justice, vol. 3, no. 1, 
2003, p. 95. 
37  W Yates, ‘Human Traffic: China’, MTV Exit Production, Beijing, China, retrieved 5 February 2015, 
http://mtvexit.org/humantrafficen/#learn  
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Burma passed its National Anti-Trafficking Legislation in 2005, and at the same time joined 
China in signing a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding to organise responses to cross-
border trafficking of people.38 China and Burma are part of the consortium of countries in 
East and Southeast Asia that recognise the universal criminality of human trafficking and the 
need for international cooperation. Six of these countries, Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, 
Thailand and Vietnam, have formed a ministerial policy coordination group called the 
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking, or COMMIT.39 In Burma, under 
two similar National Plans of Action for Combating Trafficking (2007–2011 and 2012–2016), the 
Ministry of Home Affairs established the Central Body for Suppression of Trafficking in 
Persons. This Central Body’s main function is the creation of a new branch of the Burmese 
police force that will act as a wide-reaching Anti-Trafficking Task Force network system that 
has also established internal Task Force units and Border Liaison Offices with Thailand and 
China.  
 
The Burmese Anti-Trafficking Police regularly releases reports on the types of cases 
investigated by their border liaison offices and taskforces. In 2012, they prosecuted 120 
cases, of which 79% were identified as forced marriage from Burma into China.40 Government-
run shelters for trafficking victims have been established in Mandalay and Myawaddy, and 
they also provide counselling and job training for those repatriated from China or Thailand.41 
The Burmese police work with NGOs Save the Children and World Vision to run educational 
campaigns and shelter programmes, and with other international groups like Australian Aid to 
supply specialised police training. Civil society groups in Burma are currently trying to pass a 
new Association Registration Law that would decrease regulations for the formation of 
domestic NGOs. The current Law Relating to Forming Organizations (No. 6/88) only registers 
organisations with direct ties to the government, and as a consequence, most Burmese anti-
trafficking organisations have had to operate out of other countries such as Thailand.42 
 
Despite these efforts, the anti-trafficking regime in Burma is still focused on criminal 
prosecutions and high-profile interactions with other countries and international 
organisations. According to Julia Matrip, head of the Kachin Woman’s Association in Thailand: 
‘the regime is mainly involved in pleasing the international community rather than actually 
dealing with the problem.’43 Representatives of the Shan Women’s Association argue that the 
previously mentioned 120 human trafficking prosecutions in 2012 correlated with the 120 
arrests made on these charges.44 The 100% prosecution rate in Burma raises suspicion over the 
Burmese government’s claims of having a fair and transparent criminal justice system. 
Questions also remain regarding the Burmese police force’s investigation and arrest 
procedures. In addition to targeting traffickers, new immigration barriers are being 
implemented to protect women from threats of being trafficked. Women are being detained 
and questioned at border checkpoints. The Burmese Women’s Union argues that imprisoning 
                                            
38  The Union of Myanmar, The State and Peace Development Council, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law, 15 September 2005, 
retrieved 5 February 2015, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/trafficking/myanmar.traf.05.pdf ;The Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of the Union of Myanmar and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on 
Strengthening the Cooperation on Combating Human Trafficking, signed 11 November 2009, retrieved 5 February 2015. 
http://www.notip.org.cn/UserImages/00001039.pdf 
39  COMMIT, retrieved 5 February 2015, http://www.no-trafficking.org/commit.html  
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female migrants for trying to leave the country will not help end exploitation.45 Their main 
point is that these arrests can be factored into the Burmese government’s efforts at fighting 
human trafficking, but do not serve or improve the lives of the women seeking employment. 
Structural problems of poverty, corruption and civil conflict, especially in the northern Shan 
and Kachin states, are not being calculated into human trafficking responses by the current 
government. The Burmese anti-trafficking regime is winning accolades on the international 
stage, but on the ground the situation for most of these women is not improving. 
 
Burmese women migrate to China for many reasons, including the pursuit of economic 
opportunities in China, flight from civil conflict in Burma or a combination of both. Women 
migrate to save their families from starvation, pay off debts or afford basic necessities. For 
the past fifty years, the civil wars between the government’s army, the Tatmadaw, and 
various allied ethnic group militias have created another type of migrant: the refugee from 
civil conflict. In the Kachin and Shan areas in northern Burma, fighting has been a constant 
feature of daily life for fifty years. The Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand and the 
Palaung Women’s Association (a group located in northwest Shan state) report that in 
hundreds of cases Burmese women accept job offers in China, but then find themselves sold 
to Chinese men.46 Recruitment for a job that turns into marriage involves kinship ties or 
connections between social circles. In the past four years, there has been an increase in the 
use of websites (including Facebook), mobile phone messaging and public job advertisements 
to recruit Burmese women for sale across the border. Some recruiters openly advertise for 
brides in Burma. One website simply stated: ‘Contact me if you or your friends want to get 
married in China.’47 Women are seizing these opportunities and passing across the border with 
relative ease, aided by recruiters and their web of contacts throughout China.  
 
The situations Burmese brides find themselves in whilst in China are as varied as the number 
of Burmese brides in China themselves. The cases of women suffering abuse (physical and 
mental) or trafficking into other industries (such as sex or labour) at the hands of their 
Chinese husbands are often the only ones reported by international NGOs or the Burmese 
government. Other scenarios also exist. Upon arriving in China, many Burmese brides stay 
married for precisely the factors that drove them to migrate in the first place. In this case, 
she is able to fashion better economic conditions for herself and achieve her own personal 
hypergamy within her new social group or community. Burmese brides have also been 
documented working outside the home and sending remittances to their families across the 
border.48 
 
Burmese women are not protected under the same laws protecting the rights Chinese 
citizens, and they can be forced to leave the country against their will. A Burmese bride is 
currently unable to be eligible for a hukou, and thus, cannot travel freely, work legally or 
access important health services. She also cannot vote in village elections or seek legal help 
in the event that her husband is abusive. Most of these constraints, it should be noted, affect 
Burmese women back home as well. The system of issuing Burmese national identification 
cards is plagued with corruption and discrimination along ethnic lines.49 Even if women in 
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Burma can access hospitals, for example, the quality of the hospital is abysmal, especially 
when compared to those in China.  
 
Furthermore, a child can drastically alter the factors influencing a Burmese woman’s decision 
to remain in China. Any child produced in the marriage between a Chinese national and a 
Burmese woman has the full rights of a Chinese citizen.50 Her child will be able to have a free 
education, a hukou registration card and access to social services from the government. Aside 
from these benefits, many women choose not to leave with their children and return home to 
Burma. Even some of the women who do go back to Burma after having a child in China will 
ultimately return the latter because the Chinese family wants to be with her child.  Over 
time, I was not surprised to learn that many of these Burmese women do not view themselves 
as having been ‘sold’ to Chinese men, nor do they readily identify with or uphold the label of 
‘trafficking victim’. Marrying a Chinese man is a survival strategy and a mechanism through 




Case Study—Coordinated Local Interventions for Trafficked Women: The ‘blue card 
system 
 
Though the Chinese Ministry of Public Security officials claim that Burmese women are 
not repatriated unless they choose to be, these women are in fact considered to be 
illegal immigrants in the country and have no legal rights.51 On the Chinese side of the 
border, there are no shelters specifically for women who were forced into marriage in 
China, and most are sent straight to police stations.  
 
In 2010, Dehong Prefecture, a Dai and Jingpo ethnic minority autonomous region in the 
western part of Yunnan, created the first and only system of documenting and 
provided services to foreign women who entered the country to become wives of 
Chinese men. The local government created the Documented Registration Certificate 
for Border Residents in the Cross-Border Marriages, commonly referred to as ‘lanka’ or 
‘blue card’ due to its colour, in response to the increase of Burmese women entering 
Yunnan in the past decade. Dehong Prefecture is home to the major border city of 
Ruili, and, in 2011, approximately 7,000 blue cards were issued to Burmese women.52 
This card ensures that its bearer is no longer considered a illegal immigrant even if 
documentation from her home country cannot be produced. It also provides immunity 
from being categorised as a ‘person of three illegalities’, referrng to a person who has 
entered the country illegally, resides in the country under illegal conditions and is 
banned from working in the country.53 Additionally, women who obtain this card are 
able to apply with the rural cooperative medical care and health services stations 
found in Dehong Prefecture to receive free and/or subsidised healthcare. Other illegal 
wives in Yunnan have to rely on social networks, brokers, or bribery to receive 
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provincial rates of Chinese citizens for healthcare.54  
 
In my interviews, I found that the blue card does have several limitations. It must be 
renewed every year at the prefecture (not county) level adminitrative office.55 This 
process incurs heavy travel and time costs for many women, and is often dependent on 
the acquescience of the women’s husband. Women with a blue card are also unable to 
leave Dehong Prefecture, as this system is not recognised in China as a whole. Beijing 
Ministry officials deny the blue card system’s very existence because of the 
ramifications that this policy could have on immigration on a nation wide scale and 
because of the accountability this system would bring to bear on trafficking in persons 
reporting. The system remains hidden and contained at the local level, and quietly 
maintains semi-official records on the size of the bride population entering China from 
Burma.56 
 
The official anti-trafficking regimes adopted in Burma and China from international models 
target the marriage transaction and the movement of peoples across the border. For Burmese 
brides within China, a more appropriate human rights response to their situation is needed to 
address the dearth of protective laws and positive rights that should protect them in their 
new marriage and home. Migrating for marriage or a job is frequently an act of economic 
necessity and ought be seen as a bold act of courage taken by women who have no 
economically viable alternative. The lack of recognition of their rights as migrants, wives, 





The purpose of this study is to expose several of the pitfalls and misconceptions inherent in 
the anti-trafficking movement’s universal criminalisation of human trafficking under the 
Trafficking Protocol. Traditional marriage in China is expanding to accommodate the 
increased demand for brides by Chinese men. This expansion has caused the market to 
evolve, but many of its core principles have remained intact. Criminalisation of bride 
trafficking puts challenges on people heavily influenced by the importance of the institution 
of marriage in Chinese society. It also disproportionately discriminates against the poorest of 
Chinese male citizens. For Burmese women, prosecutions, repatriations and anti-trafficking 
raids are contrary in nature to the wishes of Burmese with ties to China. These methods also 
do not address factors contributing to their original motivations for migration, and do not 
provide protections to those who wish to stay in China. 
 
Criminal prosecutions cannot be a substitute for access to structures of power within the 
government and society or for the ability to demand rights and represent one’s own interests. 
The Chinese and Burmese governments have recognised the trade in Burmese women across 
the China border, but now they must address its subtleties and linkages to the broader 
society. Through comprehensive understanding of the region and the desires of its 
inhabitants, there must be practical application of this knowledge through policy reform and 
appropriate NGO intervention. As anti-trafficking efforts continue to attract attention around 
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the globe, international institutions, governments and communities of activists must be aware 
of the situations facing the populations they are trying to serve, and combat the biases that 
human trafficking language and legislation can create in the field. A new outlook and 
awareness will create a stronger, more successful anti-trafficking movement, and, more 
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